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Reviewed by Steven A. Bank
Ajay Mehrotra is a leader of a new generation of tax historians and a pioneer
in the field of fiscal sociology. Befitting his richly interdisciplinary training
and acculturation, Mehrotra’s work is not merely a history of the tax laws,
but an almost anthropological peek at the development of the nation’s fiscal
architecture. Although others have written about the origins of the income tax
from a variety of disciplinary perspectives,1 few are able to weave together the
law, politics, sociology, and economics in the way he does.
In Making the Modern American Fiscal State, all of the best qualities of
Mehrotra’s work are on display. The book is careful, nuanced, informative,
and comprehensive, painting a detailed picture of how the revenue system
was radically remade over this period from a system based upon the necessity
to consume to a system based upon the ability to pay. In the early nineteenthcentury federal revenue system, which Mehrotra calls the Old Fiscal Order,
America relied primarily upon regressive tariffs or customs duties to fund
expenses at the national level. These were consumption taxes levied on
products and goods imported into the country.
As with consumption taxes generally, such as the modern retail sales tax
levied by states and municipalities, tariffs were regressive in the sense that they
disproportionately burdened those of modest means. Rather than being borne
by foreign importers, tariffs were largely passed on to consumers in the form
of higher prices. Although there were some luxury goods that were purchased
primarily by wealthier customers, most customs duties were on staples that
everyone bought directly or indirectly in other products, and consumption
was distributed fairly evenly among economic groups. This meant that even if
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everyone consumed roughly the same amount of a product and bore roughly
the same nominal amount of the additional cost attributable to the customs
duties, the percentage of a wealthy person’s income taken by such additional
cost was far less than the percentage of a poorer person’s income.
What compounded the regressivity of the tariff beyond that of a mere
consumption tax is that tariffs effectively benefited wealthy domestic producers
at the expense of consumers, the bulk of whom were decidedly lower on the
socio-economic scale. In part, this was because the tariffs often were designed
not to raise revenue, but rather to protect growing domestic industries
against the competition from foreign imports. In theory, the protection did
not have to drastically affect the price borne by consumers. The differential
between domestic products and foreign imports as a result of the tariff simply
should have driven consumers to buy the domestic products. That would
have enriched domestic producers, which may have raised questions about
the distribution of government power and largesse, but without seriously
burdening consumers except perhaps as to choice and quality of the product
purchased. In reality, though, tariffs enabled domestic producers to raise their
prices to a point just below the tariff-driven rise in price for the comparable
imported products. This meant that tariffs facilitated a windfall for domestic
producers who were generally on the higher end of the income distribution,
while levying a cost on consumers that was disproportionately felt by those who
were of modest means. Moreover, as Mehrotra describes, opponents charged
that tariffs exacerbated this regressive effect by removing competition and
thereby facilitating “economic collusion and the concentration of corporate
power in the form of trusts and other monopolies” (50). So, in the industries
where tariffs offered protection to domestic concerns, the resulting drop in
competition may have permitted those domestic manufacturers and producers
to ultimately raise their prices even beyond that originally occasioned by the
tariff.
Although Mehrotra is not the first to observe the revenue system’s shift away
from the reliance on regressive tariff taxes toward more progressive income
taxes, he provides a much richer picture of how it occurred. He describes
how this transformation took place not just through legislative enactments,
but also through academic discourse. As befitting someone steeped in the
Elliot Brownlee tradition of economic history, Mehrotra devotes ample time
to profiling the pioneering public finance economists whom he credits for
this progressive transformation in academic theory, including Henry Carter
Adams, Richard T. Ely, and Edwin R.A. Seligman (97-120). Perhaps his
greatest contribution is in the book’s detailed description of the centralization
of fiscal authority and the concomitant development of the administrative
apparatus to operate the new system (293-348).
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One might be tempted, however, in the wake of Thomas Piketty’s tome
Capital in the Twenty-First Century,2 to ask whether the transformation Mehrotra
describes actually accomplished very much. Piketty did find a reduction in
inequality between 1910 and 1950 that roughly parallels the growth in the
progressive income tax that Mehrotra describes, but he similarly observed
a “resurgence of inequality after 1980 . . . due largely to the political shifts
of the past several decades, especially in regards to taxation and finance.”3
The implication is that while Mehrotra may have described a transformative
period in American finance, it was one that was rolled back in the latter half
of the twentieth century. This is something that Mehrotra foreshadows in his
description of the post-World War I period, when the rise of Republican fiscal
policy under Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon led to a rapid and drastic
decline in the high graduated rates that had been enacted during the war (396404).
Moreover, some observers of taxation during this period question whether
the reduction in inequality during the first half of the century had much to do
at all with the introduction of the income tax. Piketty attributed it primarily to
the First and Second World Wars and the policies adopted in association with
the war effort and subsequent recovery.4 The advent of a system of pension
payments for Civil War veterans has been described as similarly important
to the creation of a social welfare state,5 although it is fair to conclude that its
stability was at least partly attributable to the revenue from income taxation.
Others have gone further in dismissing the progressive origins of the
income tax. Political scientist Robert Stanley, writing about the income tax’s
beginnings during the Civil War and continuing through the ratification of
the Sixteenth Amendment and the adoption of the first modern income tax,6
described the tax as counterrevolutionary. According to Stanley, “income
taxation was invoked to forestall dissent against the course of centrism during
times of economic crisis.”7 As Stanley pointed out, the income tax did little to
redistribute wealth. The income tax levied a one percent normal charge and
up to a six percent surcharge.8 This was a far cry from the rates advocated by
progressives at the time the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax was
adopted in 1913, with Representative Ira Copley’s proposal for a top surtax rate
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of sixty-eight percent falling on deaf ears.9 Moreover, the thresholds for the
adopted rates were quite limited, with the normal rate applying to individual
incomes in excess of $3000 and the top rate applying only when incomes
exceeded $20,000.10 This was at a time when the mean adult male income was
estimated to be $578,11 making the income tax essentially inapplicable to the
vast majority of the population and the top rates applicable to an exceedingly
small circle of people. Three-tenths of one percent of the population had to
pay the tax in 1916, which amounted to a mere one percent of the workforce.12
Furthermore, the income tax revenues constituted only 11.5 percent of federal
revenues in 1915, which was more of a reflection of the decline of tariff revenues
due to the onset of World War I in Europe than a higher burden for the upper
class.13 From Stanley’s perspective, all the income tax did was to acquiesce
the masses that might have otherwise seized the opportunity presented by
economic instability to revolt as they did against czarist Russia.
In Making the Modern American Fiscal State, Mehrotra responds to Stanley and
other New Left legal historians by focusing on the permanent shift in the
base of taxation ushered in during this period. Mehrotra maintained that “[t]
he dramatic shift from a regressive, hidden, disaggregated, and politicized
tax system to a graduated, transparent, and centrally and professionally
administered one was a tremendous achievement” (27). The stability of the
new fiscal order developed incrementally through accretion rather than
dramatically through a particular court decision or legislative enactment,
but it was no less permanent. According to Mehrotra, “[t]his transformation
may not have gone as far as some dissent activists, theorists, and legislators
had hoped, but it ultimately laid the foundation for a revolution in American
fiscal relations. The idea that this was purely a palace revolution . . . provides
only a partial accounting of a considerably more complex and consequential
historical moment” (27). Mehrotra might have extended his study through
World War II, when the tax fully assumed its place as the most important
source of federal revenues,14 to better make his point, but he does convincingly
establish that the income tax became entrenched by 1929.
Although Stanley’s revisionism likely goes too far in rejecting the
progressive nature of the move to income taxation, what may be lost in
Mehrotra’s defense of the momentous nature of the transformation is the
extent to which the progressivism involved in the shift was more contextual,
political, and contingent than the rhetoric might suggest. There were certainly
those who envisioned a radically redistributive type of progressive taxation,
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but they weren’t exactly the winners in this debate. Arguably, the winning
theory of income taxation was one that is hardly ever discussed today and is
not mentioned in Making the Modern American Fiscal State—one Edwin Seligman
called in 1908 the “special compensatory theory.”15 This was distinguished
from the general compensatory theory, which posited that the income tax
was necessary to offset “the inequalities consecrated by custom and by law”
whereby “the legal conditions of society naturally favor the rich.”16 Under
the special compensatory theory, the revenue system is viewed as a whole and
one form of taxation is made progressive to make up for the regressive effects
of another specific form of taxation. According to Seligman, the income tax
and other similar direct taxes are “designed to act as an engine of reparation”
against the regressivity of the customs duties and excise taxes.17 “In order to
attain equal treatment,” Seligman wrote, “regressive indirect taxes,” must be
counterbalanced by the progressive direct tax.”18
It’s not that Mehrotra ignores this part of the story. For example, he explains
that in 1894 “[income] tax advocates . . . reminded their opponents that the
proposed income tax was merely a supplement to a larger tariff regime, and
that national taxation was just one part of a broader fiscal order that included
many forms of regressive taxat[ion].” (128). But Mehrotra characterizes this
as a mere political compromise that served as a weigh station on the road to
the true progressivity of an income-centric tax system, rather than being a part
of the design itself. Instead, it may be better understood as a view that the
base and the rates of an income tax could ratchet up or down based on the
makeup of the remainder of the system. Indeed, during the debates over the
first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax bill in 1913, Senator John Sharp
Williams, the leader of the Democratic caucus, argued that “when the good
day comes—the golden day—when there will be no taxes upon consumption at
all . . . and no import duties at all except countervailing duties to offset them…
[then] everybody will pay in proportion to his income,” which, in effect meant
a flat rate.19 The transformation Mehrotra describes was important and it was
progressive (in no small part due to the advance of fiscal citizenship that is one
of the book’s themes), but it was not necessarily designed to lead to progressive
income taxation in the sense of steeply graduated marginal rates.
Perhaps this is why the “retrenchment” Mehrotra describes in the 1920s was
less a retreat from the principles of progressivity and more a reflection of the
return to the mean for income taxation in its service as a mild counterbalance
to the continued presence of regressive features, including, in more modern
times, the regressivity arising from the unequal distribution of tax evasion
opportunities and from the wage taxes that disproportionately burden the
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lower and middle classes. In many respects, the fundamentally moderate
or even conservative underpinnings of the original income tax continues to
describe the tax laws and frustrate reformers, including those who see Piketty’s
description of the rise of inequality as a clarion call for new forms of wealth
taxation. Nevertheless, the fundamental point driven home by Mehrotra’s
Making the Modern American Fiscal State is that the brilliance of the federal revenue
system is its ability to accommodate more progressive reforms, even if the
political will may not currently exist to adopt them.

